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Abstract
In this paper, we present a fully fiber-based one-way Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system
implementing the Gaussian-Modulated Coherent States (GMCS) protocol. The system employs
a double Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (MZI) configuration in which the weak quantum signal
and the strong Local Oscillator (LO) go through the same fiber between Alice and Bob, and are
separated into two paths inside Bobs terminal. To suppress the LO leakage into the signal path,
which is an important contribution to the excess noise, we implemented a novel scheme combining
polarization and frequency multiplexing, achieving an extinction ratio of 70dB. To further minimize
the system excess noise due to phase drift of the double MZI, we propose that, instead of employing
phase feedback control, one simply let Alice remap her data by performing a rotation operation. We
further present noise analysis both theoretically and experimentally. Our calculation shows that the
combined polarization and frequency multiplexing scheme can achieve better stability in practice
than the time-multiplexing scheme, because it allows one to use matched fiber lengths for the signal
and the LO paths on both sides of the double MZI, greatly reducing the phase instability caused by
unmatched fiber lengths. Our experimental noise analysis quantifies the three main contributions
to the excess noise, which will be instructive to future studies of the GMCS QKD systems. Finally,
we demonstrate, under the “realistic model” in which Eve cannot control the system within Bob’s
terminal, a secure key rate of 0.3bit/pulse over a 5km fiber link. This key rate is about two orders
of magnitude higher than that of a practical BB84 QKD system.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
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I. INTRODUCTION
One important practical application of quantum information is quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD), whose unconditional security is based on the fundamental laws of quantum
mechanics [1, 2, 3, 4]. In principle, any eavesdropping attempts by a third party, Eve, will
unavoidably introduce quantum disturbances and be caught by the legitimate users Alice
and Bob.
Recently Gaussian-modulated coherent states (GMCS) QKD protocol has drawn a lot of
attention because of its potential high key rates, especially over short distances [5, 6, 7, 8, 9].
Compared with single photon QKD protocol (such as the BB84 QKD [1]), GMCS QKD
protocol has several distinctive advantages: First, the coherent state required in the GMCS
QKD protocol can be easily produced by a practical laser source; whereas, a single photon
source prescribed by the BB84 QKD is still unavailable. To use a weak coherent source
in a single photon QKD system, special techniques, such as decoy states [10, 11, 12], are
required to improve the secure key rate. Second, the homodyne detectors in the GMCS
QKD protocol can be constructed using highly efficient PIN diodes, while the performance
of the single photon QKD is limited by the low efficiency of today’s single photon detector
[13]. Third, in GMCS QKD, information is encoded on continuous variables. More than
one bit of information could be transmitted by one pulse and thus yields a high key rate.
Recent interest has also been sparked by the fact that [5], with a “reverse reconciliation”
protocol, GMCS QKD can tolerate high channel loss (> 3dB) on the condition that the
excess noise (the noise above vacuum noise) is not too high (< 0.5). We remark that the
security analysis given by [5] is applicable to individual attacks only. The security of GMCS
QKD protocol under the most general attack is still under investigation [9].
Despite its many advantages, the implementation of the GMCS QKD over a practical
distance in fiber remains challenging, and only one other experimental demonstration has
been reported so far [8]. The major experimental challenge lies in the reduction of the
excess noise in a practical system. Here we study the performance of a fully fiber-based
one-way GMCS QKD system over a 5km span. The purpose of this study is not only to
show that GMCS QKD can be operated over a practical distance, but also to investigate
various sources of excess noise in a real system, and to offer practical solutions to reduce or
eliminate some of the noise sources. Our experiment with a 5km fiber demonstrates a secure
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rate of 0.3bit/pulse under a “realistic model” in which we assume that Eve cannot control
Bob’s system. This key rate is about two orders higher than that of a practical BB84 QKD
system.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II is a brief review of GMCS QKD protocol.
In Section III, we discuss our experimental setup and summarize the experimental results.
In Section IV, we present a detailed noise analysis and discuss noise control in a practical
system. Section V is a brief conclusion.
II. GAUSSIAN-MODULATED COHERENT STATES (GMCS) QKD PROTOCOL
The basic scheme of the GMCS QKD protocol is as follows [5]: Alice draws two random
numbers XA and PA from a set of Gaussian random numbers (with a mean of zero and a
variance of VAN0) and sends a coherent state |XA + iPA〉 to Bob. Here N0 = 1/4 denotes
the shot-noise variance [14]. In this paper, all variances are in the shot noise units. Bob
randomly chooses to measure either the amplitude quadrature (X) or phase quadrature (P)
with a phase modulator and a homodyne detector. After performing his measurement, Bob
informs Alice which quadrature he actually measures for each pulse through an authenticated
public channel. Alice drops the irrelevant data and only keeps the quadrature that Bob has
measured. At this stage, Alice shares a set of correlated Gaussian variables (called the “raw
key”) with Bob. Alice and Bob then publicly compare a random sample of their raw key
to evaluate the transmission efficiency of the quantum channel and the excess noise of the
QKD system. Based on the above parameters, they can evaluate the mutual information
IAB and IBE .
Assuming Alice’s modulation variance is VA, the channel efficiency is G and the total effi-
ciency of Bob’s device (including the optical losses and the efficiency of homodyne detector)
is η, IAB and IBE are determined by [5]
IAB =
1
2
log2[(V + χ)/(1 + χ)] (1)
IBE =
1
2
log2[(ηG)
2(V + χ)(V −1 + χ)] (2)
Here, V = VA + 1 is the quadrature variance of the coherent state prepared by Alice. χ is
the equivalent noise measured at the input, which can be separated into “vacuum noise”
χvac = (1−ηG)/ηG (noise associated with the channel loss and detection efficiency of Bob’s
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system) and “excess noise” ε (noise due to the imperfections in a non-ideal QKD system):
χ =
1− ηG
ηG
+ ε (3)
Assuming a reverse reconciliation algorithm efficiency of β, the secure key rate is then
given by [5]
∆I = βIAB − IBE (4)
Note, in (2), we assume that losses and noise in Bob’s system can be controlled by the
eavesdropper Eve. In practice, it may be reasonable to assume that Eve cannot control
devices inside Bob’s system. Under this “realistic model” [5], noise inside and outside of
Bob’s system are treated differently: while part of the excess noise (e.g., due to imperfections
outside of Bob’s system) might originate from Eve’s attack, the noise contributed by Bob’s
devices is an intrinsic parameter of the QKD system of which Eve has no control. Thus it
is useful to write the total excess noise ε as
ε = εA +
NBob
ηG
(5)
where εA denotes noise contribution from outside of Bob’s system, and NBob denotes noise
generated within Bob’s system (measured at the output). εA and NBob can be determined
separately.
From (3) and (5), the equivalent input noise is
χ =
1− ηG
ηG
+ εA +
NBob
ηG
(6)
Bob’s quadrature variance is given by VB = ηG(V +χ), while the conditional variance under
the “realistic model” is
VB|E =
η
1−G+G(εA + V −1)
+ (1− η) +NBob (7)
From (5)-(7), the mutual information IBE is
IBE =
1
2
log2[
ηGVA + 1 + ηGε
η/(1−G+GεA +GV −1) + 1− η +NBob
] (8)
Again, the secure key rate is determined by (4). Note (8) is equivalent to (3) in [8].
4
FIG. 1: The optical layout of our GMCS QKD system. L: 1550 nm CW fiber laser; PC1−5: po-
larization controllers; PBS1−3: polarization beam splitters/combiners; AM0−1: amplitude modu-
lators; PM1−2: phase modulators; SW1−2: optical switches; AOM+ (AOM−): upshift (downshift)
acousto-optic modulator; VOA1−2: variable optical attenuators; ISO: isolator; C: fiber coupler;
HOM: homodyne detector.
III. GMCS-QKD EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present our experimental setup, followed by discussions on the
technical challenges. Finally, we present our QKD experimental results.
A. Experimental setup
The schematic of our experimental setup is shown in Fig.1. The laser source is a 1550nm
continuous-wave fiber laser (NP Photonics). Alice uses a LiNbO3 amplitude modulator
(AM0) to generate 200-ns laser pulses at a repetition rate of 100KHz. She then prepares
a coherent state |XA + iPA〉 with the second amplitude modulator (AM1) and a phase
modulator (PM1). AM1 and PM1 are driven by Arbitrary Waveform Generators (AWG)
which contain random amplitude and phase data produced from {XA, PA}. Alice sends
Bob the quantum signal together with a strong local oscillator (LO) as the phase reference
through a 5km telecom fiber. On Bob’s side, he randomly chooses to measure either X or
P with his phase modulator (PM2) and a homodyne detector. The phase modulator PM2 is
located in the reference path of Bob’s MZI and is driven by a third AWG which contains a
binary random file for choosing X or P . The homodyne detector is constructed by a pair of
photo-diodes and a low noise charge sensitive amplifier, similar to the one described in [15].
Note, to reduce the noise due to multiple reflections of LO in Bob’s system, a fiber isolator
has been placed in the signal arm of Bob’s MZI. The outputs of the homodyne detector are
sampled by a 12-bit data acquisition card (NI, PCI-6115) at a sampling rate of 10MS/s.
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FIG. 2: The leakage of the local oscillator in the double Mach-Zehnder interferometer scheme:
Sig-quantum signal; LO-local oscillator; LE-leakage of LO.
There are two significant technical challenges in this double Mach-Zehnder interferometer
(MZI) scheme: First, the leakage (LE) of the strong LO (typically 108 photons/pulse) into
the signal path has to be reduced effectively, particularly because the quantum signal is very
week (typically less than 100photons/pulse). Ideally there should be no LE. The LO and
the signal (Sig) are supposed to go through different arms in Bob’s interferometer. For an
non-ideal system in our experiment, however, we expect that there will be some leakage LE
to the same arm as the signal, see Fig.2. If LE is in the same spatiotemporal mode and the
same polarization state as the LO, it will interfere with LO and contribute to the excess
noise. Second, the phase fluctuation introduced by the MZI, which is one of the major
contributions to excess noise, has to be minimized. We discuss these issues in the next two
subsections.
B. Reduce the leakage of the local oscillator
In a report by J. Lodewyck, et al. [8], to reduce excess noise due to the leakage, LE is
separated from LO in the time domain by using MZIs with largely unbalanced path lengths.
Since LE and LO arrive at the fiber coupler (C in Fig.1) at different times, they interfere
with each other only weakly. Obviously, to minimize the overlap between LE and LO in
the time domain, the required time delay should be much larger than the width of the laser
pulse. This corresponds to a large length unbalance in the MZI (In [8], the length unbalance
of MZI is 80m). However, it is quite challenging to stabilize a MZI with such a large length
unbalance in a practical system. The phase fluctuation of the unbalanced MZI may result
in a dramatic increase in the excess noise.
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In contrast, we employ polarization multiplexing combined with frequency multiplexing
to minimize the leakage of the LO. Alice uses orthogonal polarization states for the quantum
signal and the LO via a polarization beam splitter (PBS1 in Fig.1). On Bob’s side, another
polarization beam splitter (PBS3 in Fig.1) is used to separate the LO from the signal. This
polarization multiplexing scheme is expected to yield an extinction ratio of about 30dB due
to the imperfections of the PBSs. To further suppress the excess noise due to the leakage,
we have introduced a frequency multiplexing technique: a pair of acousto-optic modulators
(AOM+ and AOM− in Fig.1) are used to upshift and downshift the frequency of the LO by
55MHz. As a result, the majority of LE can be filtered out since it has a different frequency
from LO. Although in principle the phase of the LO will also be shifted by the AOM [16],
since the driving frequency of the AOM (55MHz) is much smaller than the laser frequency
(200THz), the phase noise contributed by the AOM is negligible.
The overall equivalent extinction ratio of this scheme has been determined experimentally
to be around 70dB, and the excess noise due to the leakage is about 0.02 (measured at the
output, see details in Section IV).
C. Reduce phase fluctuation of the MZI
In both the GMCS QKD system and the phase coding BB84 QKD system, ideally, the
phase difference between the quantum signal and the LO (phase reference) should be solely
dependent on the phase information encoded by Alice. However, in practice, the zero point
of the phase difference φ0 (the phase difference when Alice encodes phase 0) will drift with
time. The GMCS QKD protocol is more sensitive to this phase drift than the BB84 QKD
protocol in the sense that a small phase drift would lower the secure key rate dramatically
[17].
Under normal condition, φ0 drifts with time slowly. It is reasonable to assume that φ0
is constant during one frame of QKD transmission (40ms in our experiment). As shown in
Fig.3, the change of φ0 measured during the QKD is 0.016/s, or 6.4 × 10
−4 in 40ms. The
corresponding contribution to excess noise (with a modulation variance of 16.9) is about
7×10−6, which is negligible. Alice and Bob can estimate the value of φ0 in this transmission
period by comparing a subset of their QKD data.
In phase coding BB84 QKD system, knowing the value of φ0 itself will not help Alice and
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FIG. 3: The phase drift observed during QKD experiment without active phase stabilization. Each
point in the curve is estimated from the QKD data in 40ms (Here, we assume the phase change
in 40ms is small enough to be neglected). The total phase drift is about 0.016/s, or 6.4 × 10−4 in
40ms.
.
Bob to lower the quantum bit error rate (QBER). To control the QBER due to the phase
drift, a phase re-calibration process is essential: Alice and Bob have to perform a phase
feedback control to compensate this phase drift before they start the key transmission [18].
In contrast, in GMCS QKD, we propose a simpler way to remove the excess noise due
to the phase drift φ0: once Alice and Bob know the value of φ0, instead of performing
feedback phase control, Alice can simply modifiy her data to incorporate this phase drift.
Specifically, during the classical communication stage, Bob announces a randomly-selected
subset of his measurement results. Alice can estimate φ0 and other system parameters from
Bob’s measurement results and her original data. Then she maps her data {XA, PA} into
{X ′A, P
′
A} by performing
X ′A = XA cosφ0 + PA sinφ0 (9)
P ′A = −XA sinφ0 + PA cosφ0 (10)
Alice and Bob can produce a secure key from {X ′A, P
′
A} and {XB, PB}. The security analysis
of GMCS QKD still holds.
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FIG. 4: (a) QKD experimental results (40000 points). The equivalent input noise has been de-
termined experimentally to be χ = 2.25, which includes “vacuum noise” χvac = 2.00 and “excess
noise” ε = 0.25. (b) Simulation results: assuming “vacuum noise” χvac = 2.00 and “excess noise”
ε = 0.
.
The above approach reduces the excess noise due to the slow drift of φ0, but it does
not solve the problem of fast variations in φ0 resulted from instabilities in the MZIs. This
instability is worse when the path lengths of the MZIs are not balanced. Fortunately,
because we employ the combined polarization and frequency multiplexing instead of time
multiplexing, we can use balanced MZIs. To further stabilize the MZIs, we carefully balance
their path lengths and place each of them into an enclosure to minimize environmental noise.
D. Experimental results
We perform the QKD experiment with a strong LO (8× 107 photons/pulse) and a signal
of modulation variance of 16.9. Data are transmitted by frames. Each frame contains 4000
points (Gaussian random numbers). Among them, Bob performs X quadrature measure-
ments on 1980 points and P quadrature measurements on 2020 points. The same random
patterns are used repeatedly in our experiment. The experimental results are shown in
Fig.4a. The equivalent input noise has been determined experimentally to be χ = 2.25. For
comparison, Fig.4b shows the simulation results under the assumption of no excess noise.
The channel efficiency G and the total efficiency of Bob’s device η have been calibrated
carefully to be G = 0.758 and η = 0.44 (including optical loss in Bob’s system 0.61 and
the efficiency of the homodyne detector 0.72)[19]. Using (1), (2) and (4) the secure key
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FIG. 5: Simulation result results (a)β = 1 (b) β = 0.898[8]
.
rate under the general model has been calculated to be 0 if we assume β = 0.898 [8] or
0.13bit/pulse is we assume β = 1.
To estimate the secure key rate under the “realistic model”, we need to determine ε, εA
and NBob. From χ = 2.25, G = 0.758 and η = 0.44, we can determine ε = 0.25 by using
(3). Experimentally, as will be discussed in detail in Section IVA later, we have estimated
εA = 0.056. From (5), we can calculate NBob = 0.065 (see details in Section IV). Using (1),
(8) and (4), the secure key rate under the realistic model has been calculated to be either
0.30 (β = 0.898) or 0.43 (β = 1). Table 1 summarizes our experimental results.
Using the parameters in Table 1, we have performed numerical simulations under both
the general model and the realistic model. Here we assume the quantum channel is telecom
fiber with a loss of 0.21 dB/km. Fig.5a shows the result with a perfect reverse reconciliation
algorithm (β = 1). Fig.5b shows the result with a practical reverse reconciliation algorithm
(β = 0.898).
As shown in Fig.5, under the “realistic model”, the achievable secure key rate is signifi-
cantly higher than that of a practical BB84 QKD.
TABLE I: QKD parameters and results (e: experimental result; c: calculated result).
VA G η χ ε εA NBob R
gen
β=1 R
gen
β=0.898 R
rea
β=1 R
rea
β=0.898
16.9(e) 0.758(e) 0.44(e) 2.25(e) 0.25(c) 0.056(e) 0.065(c) 0.13(c) 0(c) 0.43(c) 0.30(c)
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION AND ANALYSIS ON EXCESS NOISE
To estimate the secure key rate under the “realistic model”, we have to separate ε into
εA and NBob (see (8)). In this section, we will discuss how to estimate εA and NBob in a
practical GMCS QKD system and other practical issues.
A. Estimate εA
εA is the excess noise due to imperfections outside of Bob’s system, which includes the
phase noise of the laser source, imperfect amplitude and phase modulations, the phase noise
of the interferometer, etc.. To reduce the phase noise of MZIs, we carefully balance their
path lengths and enclose them to minimize environmental noise. To reduce the excess noise
due to the imperfect modulations, both the amplitude modulator and the phase modulator
have been calibrated carefully before the QKD experiment. Nevertheless, Alice and Bob
have to measure εA experimentally in order to apply the“realistic model”.
Following [6], we assume that εA is proportional to the modulation variance VA and can
be described by εA = VAδ . We have designed a procedure to determine the proportionality
constant δ, by operating the system with a large modulation variance (VA ≈ 40000) and a
weak LO (105 photons/pulse, to reduce its leakage). Under this condition, all other excess
noises in (6) except εA are negligible, ie., χ ≃ VAδ. We can determine δ by normalizing the
observed equivalent input noise χ to the modulation variance VA.
Fig.6 shows the experimental results. The measured δ is 0.0033 (In another test with
VA ≈ 80000, the measured δ is 0.0032). Therefore, for a modulation variance of VA = 16.9,
the expected excess noise component εA = 0.056.
B. Estimate NBob
In Section IIID and IIIA, we experimentally determined: χ = 2.25, G = 0.758, η = 0.44,
and εA = 0.056. From these parameters, we can obtain ε = 0.25 by using (3), and obtain
NBob = 0.065 by using (5).
In this subsection, we will discuss the two main sources of NBob, namely, the electrical
noise of the homodyne detector (Nel) and the noise associated with the leakage of LO (Nleak).
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FIG. 6: Determine δ by using a high modulation variance VA ≈ 40000 and a weak LO (10
5 photons
per pulse). The result is δ = 0.0033 (40000 points).
Since the electrical noise of the homodyne detector scales with its bandwidth, intuitively,
a narrow bandwidth should be used to minimize the electrical noise. However, a narrow
bandwidth would result in a wide pulse in time domain, which in turn reduces the achievable
repetition rate of the QKD system. Therefore, a trade-off has to be made between the speed
and the electrical noise.
We remark that this constraint on the noise and the speed of the homodyne detector could
be relaxed by adopting the “dual-detector method” [20]: the legitimate receiver randomly
uses either a fast but noisy detector or a quiet but slow detector to measure the incoming
quantum signals. The measurement results from the quiet detector can be used to upper
bound the eavesdropper’s information, while the measurement results from the fast detector
are used to generate a secure key.
Nevertheless, in our current setup, the bandwidth of the homodyne detector is about
1MHz. The electrical noise is about 13.4dB below the shot noise (with a LO of 8 × 107
photons/pulse), as shown in Fig.7. The corresponding Nel is therefore 0.045.
The analysis of the excess noise associated with the leakage of LO is more complicated.
Here, we estimate the order of magnitude of Nleak in both time-multiplexing scheme and
polarization-frequency-multiplexing scheme by treating the leakage LE as a classical elec-
tromagnetic wave with a Gaussian shape [21]. More rigorous results could be acquired by
12
FIG. 7: Noise of the balanced homodyne detector. The electrical noise is independent of the photon
number of the local oscillator while the shot noise is directly proportional to the photon number
of the local oscillator. With a local oscillator of 8 × 107 photons/pulse, the electrical noise (the
variance observed at a low photon number of the local oscillator) is about 13.4dB below the shot
noise .
solving this problem quantum mechanically.
Case 1: Nleak in time-multiplexing scheme
In this scheme, MZIs with large unbalanced paths are employed to introduce a time delay
between the LO and its leakage LE, as shown in Fig.8. We denote the average photon number
of the leakage as 〈nle〉. Note only part of LE–the part that is in the same spatiotemporal
mode as the LO–will interfere with LO and contribute to the excess noise. We denote the
average photon number of this “effective” leakage as 〈nele〉.
The “effective” leakage 〈nele〉 can be estimated from
〈nele〉 = α〈nle〉 (11)
where α is the overlapping factor between LO and LE.
Assuming a Gaussian pulse shape, the normalized electrical fields of LO and LE can be
13
FIG. 8: The time-multiplexing scheme: Sig-quantum signal; LO-local oscillator; LE-leakage of LO.
Note Sig and LO arrive the fiber coupler (C) at the same time, while LE has been delayed.
described by
Elo = E0 exp(−
(t−∆t/2)
2
2σ2t
) exp(−iω0t) (12)
Ele = E0 exp(−
(t +∆t/2)
2
2σ2t
) exp[−i(ω0t+ φle)] (13)
Here the normalizing factor is E20 =
1√
piσt
, ∆t is the time delay between LO and LE, φle is
the phase difference between LO and LE, and σt is related to the full width at half maximum
(FWHM) σFW by σt =
σFW
2
√
ln2
.
The overlapping factor α can be calculated from
α = |
∫ ∞
−∞
E∗loEledt|
2 = [E20
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(−
t2
σ2t
)dt]2 exp(−
∆2t
2σ2t
) = exp(−
∆2t
2σ2t
) (14)
Here we use the normalization relation E20
∫∞
−∞ exp(−
t2
σ2
t
)dt = 1.
If Bob chooses to measure the X quadrature, the contribution from the leakage is (see
Fig.9)
Xle =
√
〈nele〉 cosφle (15)
Because of the large length unbalance required in this scheme, we assume that the relative
phase φle randomly and rapidly changes in the range of [0, 2pi]. The corresponding excess
noise (in shot noise units) is
Nleak = 4〈X
2
le〉 = 4〈n
e
le〉〈(cosφle)
2〉 = 2〈nele〉 (16)
Using (11), (14) and (16), Nleak can be estimated by
Nleak = 2〈nle〉 exp(−
∆2t
2σ2t
) (17)
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FIG. 9: The contribution of the effective leakage on X quadrature measurement.
From another point of view, the required time delay for a given Nleak can be estimated
by
∆t =
√
2 ln(
2〈nle〉
Nleak
)σt (18)
If a simple time-multiplexing scheme is adopted, and a 3dB coupler is used in Bob’s
MZI, the leakage LE will be on the same order as LO. Assuming 〈nle〉 = 10
8, σt = 60ns
(corresponds to σFW = 100ns), to suppress the excess noise Nleak to below 0.02 (this is the
Nleak observed in our polarization-frequency-multiplexing setup), the required time delay
calculated from (18) is about 406ns, which corresponds to a 81m fiber length difference in
MZI.
If time-multiplexing and polarization-multiplexing are combined to suppress the leakage,
then the leakage LE will be three orders of magnitude lower than LO (assuming a 30dB
polarization extinction ratio). Using 〈nle〉 = 10
5, σt = 60ns and Nleak = 0.02, the required
time delay is about 340ns, which corresponds to a 68m fiber length difference in MZI.
Based on the above calculations, we can see that although the excess noise due to leakage
can be effectively reduced by employing this time multiplexing scheme, the required length
unbalance is quite large. In practice, it is quite challenging to stabilize a MZI with such a
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large length unbalance. Without phase stabilization, the phase fluctuation of the unbalanced
MZI will result in a dramatic increase in the excess noise.
Case 2: Nleak in polarization-frequency-multiplexing scheme
If the laser pulse has an ideal Gaussian-shaped spectrum, the calculations in Case 1 can
be easily extended into frequency domain. Similar to (14), in the spectral domain, the
overlapping factor α can be estimated from
α = exp(−
∆2ν
2σ2ν
) (19)
where ∆ν is the frequency difference between LO and LE, while σν is the spectral width of
the laser pulse.
For a 100ns (FWHM) transform limited Gaussian pulse, it’s spectral width (FWHM) is
about 4.4MHz, or σν ≈ 2.64MHz. With a ∆ν of 55MHz, from (19), we would expect an
extremely small α (< 10−90), which means the leakage contribution to the excess noise is
negligible. Though in practice, the spectrum of a practical laser source doesn’t have an
ideal Gaussian shape: far from the peak wavelength, the spectral power density approaches
a constant noise floor. The overlapping factor α is mainly determined by this noise floor.
Here, we estimate the order of magnitude of α from experimental data directly. Since we
design MZIs with carefully balanced path lengths, in the period of one frame of transmission
(40ms), the phase difference between LO and LE has a constant average value φ
(0)
le with a
small fluctuation term ∆φle
φle = φ
(0)
le +∆φle (20)
Consequently, the contributions of LE to Bob’s measurement results are (see Fig.9)
Xle =
√
〈nele〉 cosφle = X
(0)
le +∆Xle (21)
Ple =
√
〈nele〉 sin φle = P
(0)
le +∆Ple (22)
where
X
(0)
le =
√
〈nele〉 cosφ
(0)
le (23)
P
(0)
le =
√
〈nele〉 sinφ
(0)
le (24)
∆Xle ≈ −
√
〈nele〉(sin φ
(0)
le )∆φle (25)
∆Ple ≈
√
〈nele〉(cosφ
(0)
le )∆φle (26)
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Since X
(0)
le and P
(0)
le are constant in each frame, Bob can determine their values from his
experimental results and remove their contributions by simply shifting his data. So X
(0)
le and
P
(0)
le will not contribute to excess noise. In our QKD experiment, during the post-processing
stage, Bob calculates the DC component of his measurement results for each transmission
frame, then simply subtracts this DC component from his original data.
In addition, the “effective” leakage 〈nele〉 and φ
(0)
le can be estimated from experimentally
obtained X
(0)
le and P
(0)
le :
〈nele〉 = (X
(0)
le )
2 + (P
(0)
le )
2 (27)
φ
(0)
le = arctan(
P
(0)
le
X
(0)
le
) (28)
During the QKD experiment, the average photon number of LO is around 8× 107, while
the 〈nele〉 has been determined using (27) to be 6, indicating an overall equivalent extinction
ratio of ∼ 70dB.
From (25) and (26), the excess noise due to leakage Nleak is proportional to 〈n
e
le〉 can be
described by
Nleak = 〈n
e
le〉γ (29)
Let us estimate γ from experimental data: NBob has been determined to be 0.065 (Section
IVB) andNel has been determined to be 0.045 (Section IVB). Thus Nleak is about 0.02. Using
〈nele〉 ≈ 6, we obtain γ to be on the order of 0.003. In Section IVA, we described εA as VAδ
and determined δ to be 0.0033. Since both γ and δ are associated with the phase noise
of MZI and the laser source, we expect that these quantities to have the same order of
magnitude, and indeed they do.
One major advantage of the polarization-frequency-multiplexing scheme is that balanced
MZIs can be employed. Under the same conditions, the phase noise of balanced MZIs should
be much lower than MZIs with large path length imbalance. The resulting improvements
are two folds: first, a small phase fluctuation between LO and signal corresponds to a small
excess noise εA. Secondly, a small phase fluctuation between LO and LE reduces the excess
noise due to the leakage.
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C. Other practical issues with GMCS QKD
As shown in Table 1, under the “realistic model”, the achievable secure key rate of
our system is significantly higher than that of a practical BB84 QKD over short distances.
However, to achieve such a high key rate, the excess noises in the system need to be controlled
effectively and the system parameters need to be determined with high accuracies.
Note in the BB84 QKD system with a single photon source, Eve’s information is upper
bounded by the QBER, which can be estimated by Alice and Bob from their QKD results
directly. In practice, a moderate error on determining QBER will not change the secure key
rate significantly [22].
However, there is a major challenge in GMCS QKD: to calculate the secure key rate
under the “realistic model”, in addition to the total transmission efficiency (which is the
product of G, η and the gain of Bob’s electrical amplifier) and the equivalent input noise χ
(which can be determined from Bob’s measurement results), Alice and Bob have to develop
techniques to monitor other system parameters VA, G, η and εA with high degree of accuracy
in real time.
For example, among the total equivalent input noise χ = 2.25, the contribution of vacuum
noise (2.0) is much higher than that of the excess noise (0.25)[23]. To acquire a tight bound
on εA from the experimentally measured equivalent input noise χ (see (6)), Bob has to
determine the total efficiency ηG with an extremely high accuracy. Using (6) and parameters
in Table 1, to achieve an accuracy of 0.01 in εA estimation, the required accuracy on ηG
estimation is 0.1%.
To estimate εA accurately without referring to ηG, we have designed a separated calibra-
tion process (see Section IVA). Strictly speaking, this cannot be applied to QKD experiment
directly, since Eve may attack this calibration process and QKD process differently. We need
to develop special techniques to estimate each system parameter accurately without com-
promising the security of the QKD system.
V. CONCLUSION
Gaussian-modulated coherent states (GMCS) quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol
has been proposed to achieve efficient secure key distribution with standard telecommunica-
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tion components. The performance of a practical GMCS QKD system is mainly determined
by its excess noise. In this paper, we present a fully fiber GMCS-QKD system based on
double Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI) scheme and build up a corresponding theoreti-
cal model for noise analysis. To effectively reduce the excess noise due to the leakage from
the strong local oscillator to the weak quantum signal, we introduce a novel polarization-
frequency-multiplexing scheme. To minimize the excess noise due to the phase drift of MZI,
instead of using phase feedback control, we propose that the sender simply remap her data
by performing a rotating operation. The experiment with a 5km fiber demonstrates a secure
key rate of 0.3bit/pulse under the “realistic model”. This secure key rate is about two orders
higher than that of a practical BB84 QKD system.
We analyzed and quantified various sources of excess noise in a practical GMCS QKD
system, and offered practical solutions to reduce or eliminate some of the noise sources.
We believe, in order to achieve a high secure key rate in real world, special techniques for
estimating system parameters with high accuracies in real time (without compromise the
security of the QKD system) are in demand. High speed GMCS QKD is also an important
research direction for the future.
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